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ARTICLE 
M-U-N-I: Evidencing the 
Inadequacies of the Municipal 
Securities Regulatory Framework 
John Carriel* 
ABSTRACT 
This article argues that the current regulation of the municipal securities 
market is inadequate, and that regulatory reform is not only necessary but 
also permissible as the Securities and Exchange Commission has the legal 
authority under the current statutory framework to substantially remedy 
such inadequacy. In making this argument, this article focuses on the leg-
islative history of the Securities Reform Act of 1975, analyses of statutory 
text, the current regulatory framework surrounding the municipal securi-
ties market, prior attempts to effect regulatory reform, and one of the prin-
cipal issues with the current regulatory framework–the lack of uniform ac-
counting principles in the financial statements municipal issuers use when 
issuing new securities. In addressing these topics, this article uses different 
lenses (macro, meso, and micro) to, hopefully, deliver a more compelling 
tale with three underlying themes: “The Dangers of Function Following 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article argues that current regulation of the municipal securities market 
(“muni-market”) is inadequate and that regulatory reform is not only necessary but 
also permissible under current statutory authority. Municipal securities directly im-
pact the quality of life of millions of Americans. They are used (ideally) to finance 
a community’s infrastructure, which includes roads, public safety institutions, edu-
cation, common areas, residential developments, and every other facility, program 
or institution commonly associated with a local government.1 Due in large part to 
the importance of what these securities are meant to fund, they have been afforded 
various exemptions and qualities to make them more attractive investments (for ex-
ample, favorable tax treatment).2 
Though municipal securities are meant to be used for the betterment of society, 
research as well as recent history has shed light on the fact that municipal officials 
are human beings. As with most humans, they can be self-interested, and conse-
quently, susceptible to the lure of the dollar. This attraction can and has resulted in 
the rerouting of funds raised by the issuing of a municipal bond to persons, accounts, 
or projects completely unrelated to the betterment of local communities. These ac-
tions can have far reaching effects that result in harm not only to investors, in the 
case of an issuer being unable to meet its obligations, but also to the quality of life 
for countless people. These actions can lead to homes losing substantial value nearly 
overnight, municipalities lacking funds to employ enough public safety officers, 
and necessary infrastructure like water filtration systems failing.3 
For example, the Jefferson County, Alabama, sewer construction scandal 
(which bankrupted the county) was detrimental to its citizens.4 Additional examples 
                                                          
 *  Mr. Carriel researched and wrote this article while he was a third-year law student at the George 
Washington University Law School.  Mr. Carriel is currently an associate attorney with Levi & 
Korsinsky, LLP, where he practices in the area of financial litigation, including class action litigation 
relating to corporate governance, securities, cryptocurrencies, and initial coin offerings.  The views and 
opinions expressed by Mr. Carriel in this article are not those of the George Washington University Law 
School or Levi & Korsinsky, LLP. 
     1.  See Report on the Municipal Securities Market, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION i–ii (July 
31, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf [hereinafter SEC Report]. 
 2. Tax Treatment, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BOARD, http://www.msrb.org/EducationCenter/Munic-
ipal-Market/About/Financial/Tax-Treatment.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2017). 
 3. See discussion infra p. 2. 
 4. Jefferson County engaged in a series of risky interest rate swaps and refinancing of municipal 
bonds that were issued to build sewer projects and improvements. Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Sewers of 
Jefferson County: Disclosure, Trust and Truth in Modern Finance, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 255-84 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr. eds., 2010). These bonds were to be funded by the sewer projects and included extremely favorable 
terms for the banks providing the credit swaps and refinancing. Id. at 256-259. As interest rates and fees 
on the swaps skyrocketed, Jefferson County citizens were forced to pay increasingly prohibitive fees for 
the operation of their sewers (over 300% rate hikes). Id. at 256. Eventually Jefferson County was unable 
to repay its approximately $3.14 billion in debt and was forced to declare bankruptcy in November 2011. 
Dwight V. Denison & J. Bryan Gibson, A Tale of Market Risk, False Hope, and Corruption: The Impact 
of Adjustable Rate Debt on the Jefferson County, Alabama Sewer Authority, PRACADEMICS PRESS 312, 
324, http://pracademics.com/attachments/article/877/Luby%20Symp_Art%204_Denison_Gibson.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2017). It has since been revealed that the extremely favorable terms the banks 
received in these transactions were, in part, due to bribery of county officials. Id. at 326. At least 21 
county employees and contractors involved in the sewer projects have been indicted for federal crimes 
relating to the sewer projects. Id. Further, 17 county officials (including the former mayor of Birming-
ham, Alabama) and contractors have been sentenced to federal prison in connection with corrupt 
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include Ramapo town officials who “cooked the books” after losses from building 
a baseball stadium,5 and the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation is-
suing $75 million in municipal bonds to finance a video game and subsequently 
loaning $50 million to the gaming studio without disclosing the fact that the studio 
needed $75 million to complete the game to investors.6 
Unfortunately, these are not outliers in the muni-market, rather these schemes 
are often difficult to uncover until it is too late (i.e. bankruptcy).7 More often than 
not, it would appear that most of these types of behavior are often undiscovered.8 
While not perfect, an impactful solution would be regulatory agencies placing direct 
disclosure requirements on municipal issuers (“muni-issuers”).9 This article ulti-
mately argues that one of the largest issues with the current regulatory framework 
is the lack of uniform accounting principles in the financial statements muni-issuers 
use when issuing new securities. Under the current framework, regulators do not 
require uniform accounting standards,10 which has led to issuers using accounting 
methods which are objectively unreasonable. For example, as will be discussed in 
part IV of this article, municipalities are permitted to use accounting principles 
which result in severely skewed debt calculations that do not include nearly half of 
the debt the municipality is responsible for.11 This skewing is an issue because it 
permits municipal issuers to create an image of financial stability, and issue large 
bonds and securities which, by the nature of how debt works, necessarily increases 
the potential of default. 
In discussing this issue and solution, this article uses different lenses (macro, 
meso, and micro) to, hopefully, deliver a more compelling tale with three underly-
ing themes. Part II (“The Macro-Level”) discusses the history of muni-market reg-
ulation with a focus on the Securities Reform Act of 1975 (“1975 Amendments”)12 
and its segments commonly referred to as the Tower Amendment (the “Tower”), 
named after the late Senator John Tower.13 Part II’s theme is “The Dangers of Func-
tion Following Form.” Part III (“The Meso-Level”) provides various examples of 
how the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) and the Securities and 
                                                          
financial dealings, including bribery, relating to the refinancing of the sewer bonds. Kent Faulk, Prison 
Sentence Ends for JeffCo Sewer Contractor; 3 More to Go, AL.COM (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/10/jeffco_sewer_contractor_ends_p.html. 
 5. Town Officials in New York Hid Financial Troubles from Bond Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-68.html. 
 6. The game was not completed, the studio went bankrupt, and Rhode Island was left with much of 
the debt. SEC Charges Rhode Island Agency and Wells Fargo With Fraud in 38 Studios Bond Offering, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-
37.html. 
 7. See infra Section III.B (evidencing how most securities laws violations in the muni-market are 
likely not discovered by regulatory agencies). 
 8. See infra Section III.B (evidencing how most securities laws violations in the muni-market are 
likely not discovered by regulatory agencies). 
 9. The definition of a municipal security issuer is: “[a] state, territory, political subdivision, munici-
pality, or governmental agency or authority that raises funds through the sale of municipal securities.” 
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Issuer, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BOARD, 
http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/ISSUER.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2017). 
 10. See SEC Report, supra note 1, at 70; infra Section III.A (discussing current regulatory framework 
surrounding municipal securities). 
 11. See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing debt recognition principles in North Bergen, New Jersey). 
 12. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. 
 13. Mark E. Laughman, Leaning Tower: Do the Proposed Amendments to SEC Rule 15c2-12 Violate 
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1167, 1169 (1994). 
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have cleverly attempted to create a fair and effi-
cient muni-market using indirect methods, but have been seemingly unable to do 
so. Part III presents arguments that the inability to effect regulatory reform in the 
muni-market appears to be, in large part, due to public interest not-for-profits’ lob-
bying efforts in opposition to any changes to the existing framework. Part III’s 
theme is, “The Dangers of Circuitous Regulation and Concision.” Finally, part IV 
(“The Micro-Level”) uses the Township of North Bergen, New Jersey as a case 
study for an analysis of one of the primary issues preventing the equitable operation 
of the muni-market—the lack of uniform accounting principles in muni-issuers fi-
nancial statements, and subsequently, their official statements used in connection 
with issuing new securities. Part IV’s theme is, “The Causality Dilemma.” 
There are two core arguments presented throughout: first, the current regula-
tory framework surrounding the muni-market is inadequate to prevent fraudulent 
activity and promote fair and efficient markets; and second, this need not be the 
case, as the SEC has the legal authority under the current statutory framework to 
substantially remedy these inadequacies. The agency need only boldly reject special 
interest arguments and select different provisions of statutory text to use when ex-
ercising their rulemaking authority, even if the drafter of the chosen text results in 
a less infectious public branding than the aforementioned Tower Amendment. 
II.  THE MACRO-LEVEL: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES 
REFORM ACT OF 1975 AND THE TOWER AMENDMENT 
Part II uses one of the broadest legal arguments that can be made, and has been 
made countless times. That is, the difficulty in deciphering and adhering to legisla-
tive intent often leads to dangerous occurrences of function following form. The 
inverse, “form follows function” is a common architectural principle dating back to 
the late 1800s.14 The general idea is to design a building or product based primarily 
on how it is intended to function, and its ideal form will follow.15 While this phrase 
is commonly credited to architecture, the principle can be seen in all industries and 
even life itself—as evidenced by all life having formed its varied appearances in 
pursuit of a biologically desired function (i.e. survival).16 
It would be unfair to argue that the Senate and Congress as a whole creates 
legislation without fully considering its intended function. Rather, the argument be-
low is that times change, the floor shifts, and our laws or their interpretation must 
evolve in kind. This evolution is imperative, and ultimately, when the functioning 
of legislation like the Tower becomes detrimental to the fair and efficient operation 
of the muni-market, the legislation must go the way of the tail, until all that remains 
is the coccyx (the tailbone) in the form of an entry in the index of repealed legisla-
tion on Wikipedia. Members of Congress are not clairvoyant and are unable to an-
ticipate how statutory language will be implemented decades into the future. In fact, 
it can be argued that our legislators are fully cognizant of this fact. Designations of 
                                                          
 14. Louis H. Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOTT’S MAG., Mar. 
1896, at 403–09. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See e.g., Artic Bears: How Grizzlies Evolved into Polar Bears, PBS (June 10, 2008), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/arctic-bears-how-grizzlies-evolved-into-polar-bears/777/ (explaining 
that polar bears evolved from brown bears; their design was based on the needed function of surviving 
in harsh polar environments). 
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rulemaking authorities to executive agencies is a perfect example supporting this 
position. More specific support that relates to this particular topic can be found 
within the Senate Report discussing the Tower’s adoption.17 
[T]he Commission must be in a position to review existing Board rules and 
policies to consider their adequacy in light of new knowledge and experi-
ence and changed regulatory circumstances. By continuously examining 
market circumstances and regulatory needs, appraising and reappraising 
the adequacy of existing regulatory measures, the Commission can exer-
cise its supervisory powers to ensure the continuing validity of self-regu-
lation and the effectuation of the purposes of the bill.18 
Part II presents a bird’s eye view of the current regulatory framework surround-
ing the muni-market. Part II is divided into three subparts. Subpart A endeavors to 
present a balanced view of the legislative intent behind the portions of the 1975 
Amendments relevant to the field of municipal securities. Subpart B then discusses 
the legislative intent behind the Tower. Part II concludes with subpart C providing 
a short summation and laying the groundwork for part III and the “Meso-Level.” 
A. Legislative History of the 1975 Amendments 
The 1975 Amendments were comprised of various changes to both the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)19 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Ex-
change Act”).20 In the broadest of strokes, the 1975 Amendments created the 
MSRB, adjusted the SEC’s authority over self-regulatory organizations, increased 
public access to information surrounding the activities of institutional investors, and 
authorized the SEC to create a national clearing system for securities transactions.21 
While the 1975 Amendments influenced various areas of financial regulation, this 
article only discusses its sections that are directly or indirectly relevant to the muni-
market. In terms of methodology, the following analysis uses the totality of discus-
sions and debates surrounding the adoption of the 1975 Amendments in conjunction 
with the final enacted language. This use aims to provide insight as to the intentions 
of not only Senator John Tower, but the aggregate of legislators of the time. 
In deciphering the legislative history of the Tower and available records, the 
most rational starting point is a discussion of how the topic of municipal securities 
was first broached in the Senate Report on the 1975 Amendments. In introducing 
the amendments and explaining their effects on the muni-market, the Senate Report 
states, “S.249 would also create a federal mechanism for the regulation of transac-
tions in the debt obligations of state and local government issues (‘municipal secu-
rities’) and brokers and dealers and banks engaged in a municipal securities busi-
ness.”22 The report then describes the first step in doing so as “removing the 
                                                          
 17. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 50 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 228. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012). 
 20. Id. § 78a. 
 21. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. 
 22. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 3 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 228. In contrast, the House 
Report on the 1975 Amendments is largely silent on the topic of municipal securities, and essentially 
defers to the Senate’s proposals by stating, “The House amendment contained no comparable provision. 
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exemption municipal securities have enjoyed since 1934 from practically all of the 
provisions of the Exchange Act . . .” as removal would “substantially benefit the 
increasing number of individual investors who find the tax-exempt features of these 
securities attractive.”23 The Committee reasoned that, while they were unaware of 
any widespread fraud in the muni-market, it had become clear that the muni-market 
was no longer comprised of only institutional investors.24 Therefore, the Committee 
concluded that the general exemption from regulation under the federal securities 
laws that municipal securities were historically afforded should no longer apply.25 
The Senate Report then explained that the Committee believed the best way to 
regulate the market would be through regulating municipal securities professionals, 
as opposed to imposing disclosure requirements on issuers.26 The available legisla-
tive materials indicate that the primary reasons for choosing this route was because 
the Committee had been “mindful of the historic relationship between the federal 
securities laws and issuers of municipal securities,” as well as the Committee hav-
ing been unaware of any abuses that would “justify such a radical incursion on 
states’ prerogatives.”27 In a vacuum, or perhaps just suspended with the Tower, 
these quotes appear to entirely support the notion that regulatory authorities were 
not intended to impose any disclosure requirements, in any manner, directly on 
muni-issuers. Despite this appearance, when these quotes and the Tower are read 
along with the rest of the 1975 Amendments, it becomes apparent that legislators 
intended to establish an evolving regulatory framework in the muni-market. 
B. The Tower 
The Tower, read on its face, may prohibit the SEC and the MSRB from placing 
disclosure requirements on muni-issuers. While this may be the case upon first 
glance, as discussed below, a careful reading of the Tower’s text, and counterbal-
ancing portions of the discussions surrounding its adoption, allow for a reasonable 
contrary conclusion. 
There has been a tendency to discuss the Tower as a standalone amendment.28 
The Tower is comprised of 205 words,29 and was a small part of the 1975 Amend-
ments, which had approximately 42,286 words in its entirety.30 Despite the Tower’s 
brief appearance in the 1975 Amendments, there is a compelling reason why it has 
garnered so much attention (in the field of municipal securities) over the years. This 
attention stems from the Tower’s repeated use by parties opposing muni-market 
regulatory reform, as one of the primary reasons regulatory agencies must stay far 
away from regulating the muni-market.31 This is a result of the text of the Tower 
appearing, at first glance, to explicitly prohibit regulating the muni-market. 
                                                          
The House receded to the Senate.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 101 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 332. 
 23. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 3-4. 
 26. Id. at 44. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See infra Sections III.E.1–3 (discussing efforts made by those opposing additional muni-market 
regulation). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (2012). 
 30. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. 
 31. See infra Sections III.D-E (discussing parties in opposition to amendment or repeal of the Tower). 
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Unfortunately, this current interpretation, along with opposition to regulatory re-
form, has precluded muni-market reform necessary for creating a fair and efficient 
market.32 
1. A Nuanced Analysis of Statutory Text 
At first glance, the Tower text places heavy restrictions on both the SEC and 
the MSRB with respect to the ability to require disclosure from muni-issuers. The 
Tower text in full reads as follows: 
(d)(1) Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this chap-
ter, by rule or regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities, di-
rectly or indirectly through a purchaser or prospective purchaser of secu-
rities from the issuer, to file with the Commission or the Board prior to the 
sale of such securities by the issuer any application, report, or document in 
connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such security. 
(2) The Board is not authorized under this chapter to require any issuer of 
municipal securities, directly or indirectly through a municipal securities 
broker, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, or otherwise, to fur-
nish to the Board or to a purchaser or a prospective purchaser of such se-
curities any application, report, document, or information with respect to 
such issuer: Provided, however, [t]hat the Board may require municipal 
securities brokers and municipal securities dealers or municipal advisors 
to furnish to the Board or purchasers or prospective purchasers of munici-
pal securities applications, reports, documents, and information with re-
spect to the issuer thereof which is generally available from a source other 
than such issuer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impair or 
limit the power of the Commission under any provision of this chapter.33 
Despite the Tower’s fairly express language, there are at least three reasons and 
instances from the legislative history of the 1975 Amendments as to why this lan-
guage should not be interpreted as preventing muni-market regulation. 
First is the congressional record. The Congressional Record for the period of 
time when the Tower was first introduced, evidences legislators’ intentions to limit 
the MSRB’s authority, not the SEC’s. The Tower was introduced by Senators 
Tower, Williams, Sparkman, and Brooke on April 17th, 1975.34 The Congressional 
Record from the Senate chronicles Williams introducing and explaining the portion 
commonly referred to as the “Tower Amendment” by stating, “the amendment thus 
states that the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board may not impose on issuers, 
directly or indirectly, disclosure requirements. Surely there can be no argument with 
that result.”35 That is fairly straightforward; however, it is important to note that 
                                                          
 32. See infra Sections III.D-E (discussing parties in opposition to amendment or repeal of the Tower). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d). 
 34. 121 CONG REC. 10,736 (1975). It is unclear what percentage of the Tower was drafted by Wil-
liams, Sparkman, or Brooke. Although, it can be argued that “The Tower Amendment” has a certain je 
ne sais quoi that the “Williams Amendment,” “Sparkman Amendment,” or “Brooke Amendment” would 
not have had. 
 35. Id. 
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Senator Williams was explicitly speaking of restrictions on the MSRB, not the 
SEC.36 Senator Tower soon after provided his explanation of what he believed his 
namesake was meant to accomplish: “[u]nder the amendment, the Board [MSRB] 
would not have authority to require [s]tate and local government units to provide 
information about their operations.”37 As mentioned, notably absent from Senator 
Tower’s explanation is the notion that the restrictions clearly applied to the MSRB 
were also intended to apply to the SEC. 
Second, parsing the language in both (d)(1) and (d)(2) of the Tower, in likely 
unnecessarily granular detail, indicates that an extreme level of care was taken in 
specifying the extent of specific limitations.38 A close reading of (d)(1) clearly reads 
as a restriction on the SEC and MSRB in terms of requiring filings “prior to” the 
sale of municipal securities (as opposed to any mention of restrictions on continuing 
disclosures post-sale).39 
Further, when subsection (d)(1) is read in conjunction with (d)(2) it becomes 
increasingly apparent that the text of the Tower makes efforts to distinguish be-
tween the types of restrictions on the authority to require disclosures on the MSRB 
as opposed to those meant for the SEC in (d)(1).40 For example, (d)(2) states that 
the MRSB is not authorized to require a muni-issuer, directly or indirectly, through 
a broker, dealer, municipal advisor, or otherwise, to “furnish to the Board or to a 
purchaser or a prospective purchaser . . . any application, report, document, or in-
formation with respect to such issuer.”41 While this language is clearly designed to 
place additional restrictions on the MSRB, the drafters added additional language 
that should clarify any misconception that these restrictions also applied to the SEC. 
That is, (d)(2) concludes with language emphasizing that nothing within paragraph 
(d)(2) should be construed as impairing or restricting the SEC’s authority.42 
With this in mind, it is abundantly clear that the amendment places entirely 
different levels of restrictions on the SEC and the MSRB. Further, after analyzing 
the extent of how intentionally restrictive the language in (d)(2) is, (d)(1) now reads 
as containing fairly limited restrictions on the SEC’s authority. In short, the limita-
tions placed on the SEC’s authority by the Tower were solely applicable to pre-sale 
filing requirements. 
Third, the Senate Report dedicates significant attention to addressing the pre-
cise concerns raised by muni-issuers, which were ultimately the impetus for the 
creation of the Tower.43 In discussing these concerns, the report states, “[s]pecifi-
cally, the fear has been expressed that requirements could be imposed which would 
have the effect of subjecting information disclosed by issuers in connection with an 
offering to prior review or approval . . . .”44 Again, as is plainly seen in the final and 
current version of the Tower, the primary concern meant to be addressed with the 
Tower was with respect to disclosure requirements prior to the sale of municipal 
securities.45 Given that the concern was over pre-sale filing requirements, the 
                                                          
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 10737. 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d). 
 39. Id. § (d)(1). 
 40. Id. § (d). 
 41. Id. § (d)(2). 
 42. Id. 
 43. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 44 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 228. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d). 
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Committee responded to these specific concerns over prior review or approval, by 
stating, 
The Committee agrees that no case has been made for the pre-filing re-
view, either directly or indirectly, of such sale documents, and has there-
fore included in the bill explicit language to prohibit the use of the rule-
making powers of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and the 
Commission for this purpose. Sections 3(d) and 15B(d) of the Exchange 
Act (as amended by the bill).46 
Section 3(d) is a provision excluding employees of muni-issuers acting in their 
official duties from being a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer.47 Section 
15B(d) is the Tower.48 As evidenced, the legislative history of the Tower and the 
1975 Amendments clearly indicate that the purpose of the Tower was to alleviate 
concerns over pre-sale filing requirements, and not an all-encompassing blanket 
ban on every form of disclosure requirements as it has been, and continues to be 
argued (these specific arguments will be addressed in part III of this article).49 
C. Roles of the MSRB and the SEC 
As discussed above, the 1975 Amendments made clear distinctions between 
the SEC and the MSRB with respect to their authority to regulate the muni-market.50 
The SEC’s authority over the muni-market is broader with respect to rulemaking 
intended to prevent fraud, deceit, and manipulative conduct. Further, the agency is 
tasked with the enforcement of laws and regulations relating to the muni-market.51 
In contrast, the MSRB has the more specific authority to create rules governing 
broker-dealers operating in the muni-market, and transaction specific requirements 
relating to the issuing of municipal securities.52 Specific examples of this include 
the “time and method of, documents used in connection with making settlements, 
payments, transfers, and deliveries” of municipal securities.53 In contrast, the SEC 
is precluded from making rules relating to these transaction specific activities.54 The 
MSRB is tasked with this responsibility, subject to SEC oversight.55 In other words, 
the 1975 Amendments gave the SEC oversight authority over the MSRB, which 
included the review of all of their rulemaking decisions. 
While the 1975 Amendments try to draw lines between the authority of the 
SEC and the MSRB, they also reinforce existing SEC authority in an attempt to 
stress that the creation of the MSRB and the adoption of the 1975 Amendments was 
in no way meant to detract from the SEC’s ability to combat and prevent fraudulent 
                                                          
 46. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 45. 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See infra Sections III.E.1–3 (discussing efforts made by those opposing additional muni-market 
regulation). 
 50. See supra Section II.B (analyzing the Tower). 
 51. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 50. 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(2). 
 53. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 48. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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activities. Language the Senate Report used in describing §15(c)(1) and (2) is par-
ticularly useful in determining the role legislators intended the SEC to play:56 
This power, which the SEC arguably already has under Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act, is included in the bill to make clear that the Commis-
sion’s responsibility extends beyond sanctioning those who have engaged 
in manipulative or deceptive practices with respect to municipal securities 
and includes the promulgation of prophylactic rule.57 
The use of the word “prophylactic” clearly indicates that legislators also tasked 
the SEC to work towards preventative measures in the exercise of its rulemaking 
powers. Although “prophylactic” seems to be an objectively straightforward term, 
the Supreme Court has provided substantial analysis of how the term should be 
interpreted for the purposes of SEC rulemaking.58 In United States v. O’Hagan, the 
Court was tasked with determining whether the SEC had exceeded its rulemaking 
authority under § 14 (e) of the Exchange Act in their adoption of Rule 14e-3(a).59 
Rule 14e-3(a) made it a fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive act or practice to take 
part in a tender offer when possessing nonpublic material information relating to 
the transaction, unless it is first publicly disclosed.60 The respondent argued that the 
SEC exceeded its authority under § 14 of the Exchange Act.61 Section 14(e) directs 
the SEC to create rules which “prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, 
such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”62 The Court 
read this sentence as delegating “definitional and prophylactic rulemaking authority 
to the Commission.”63 
Further, the Court acknowledged that the language in 14(e) was in fact “track-
ing” the language of 15(c)(2).64 The government used this fact to argue that 14(e) 
should be read broadly.65 The Court accepted this argument and explained that a 
“prophylactic measure, because its mission is to prevent, typically encompasses 
more than the core activity prohibited” and that Rule 14e-3(a) was “a proper exer-
cise of the SEC’s prophylactic power under § 14(e).”66 
Armed with the interpretive wiles of our highest Court, it is now even clearer 
that the SEC has the authority to enact further disclosure requirements or regulatory 
measures so long as they are designed and intended to prevent manipulative or 
fraudulent conduct in the muni-market. As is argued throughout this article, requir-
ing uniform accounting principles to be used in municipal security offering docu-
ments would be a proper exercise of this authority. Especially so, considering that 
                                                          
 56. Section15(c) contains the specific authority for the SEC to regulate “broker-dealers and municipal 
dealers” (“muni-dealers”) in the muni-market and promulgate rules intended to curtail fraudulent, ma-
nipulative, and/or deceptive acts and practices. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c). 
 57. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 50. 
 58. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 645 (1997). 
 59. Id. at 644. 
 60. Id. at 668. 
 61. Id. at 666. 
 62. Id. at 667. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 672. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 645, 672-73. 
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the primary rationale behind requiring uniformity would be to prevent manipulative 
or fraudulent conduct.67 
D. Swapping Lenses for the Meso-Level 
The 1975 Amendments, including the Tower Amendment, were not intended 
to restrict the SEC or the MSRB from regulating the muni-market.68 Rather, legis-
lative history acknowledges the fact that times and market conditions change, which 
is why the SEC and MSRB were delegated rulemaking authority over the muni-
market to begin with.69 The legislators intended deference to those intimately in-
volved in the field to ensure a constantly evolving regulatory regime.70 Evidence of 
this position is most strongly seen in the following, previously mentioned, language 
from the Senate Report, “[b]y continuously examining market circumstances and 
regulatory needs, appraising and reappraising the adequacy of existing regulatory 
measures, the Commission can . . . ensure . . . the effectuation of the purpose of the 
bill.”71 
This language indicates that legislators of the time were fully aware of the dan-
ger of function following form. In turn, they attempted, repeatedly, to place empha-
sis on the fact that the SEC and MSRB needed to continuously reevaluate their reg-
ulatory efforts, so as to fulfill the “purpose of the bill.”72 This purpose, as cited 
above, was to create a federal regulatory system over muni-markets which would 
serve to prevent fraudulent activity, and provide safer, more efficient markets for 
the benefit of individual investors.73 It would appear that legislators did not haphaz-
ardly draft the Tower without taking into account sound architectural principles 
(form follows function). With this in mind, part III first addresses how the current 
muni-market framework is inadequate, and second, why reform has been so diffi-
cult. To do so, the article will swap lenses to view the “Meso-Level.” 
III. THE MESO-LEVEL: INDIRECT CIRCUITOUS REGULATION IS 
INADEQUATE74 
Part III is comprised of five subparts. Subpart A addresses how the SEC and 
MSRB have worked within the confines of prevailing interpretations of the 1975 
Amendments and the Tower in their efforts to regulate the muni-market. Subpart B 
provides reasoning as to why these methods are inadequate for the prevention or 
detection of fraudulent activity, and the establishment of a stable and efficient muni-
market. Subpart C submits potential solutions which may aid in remedying these 
inadequacies. Subparts D and E provide analyses of recent competing arguments 
                                                          
 67. See infra Section III.C (discussing the how uniform accounting principles would aid in the detec-
tion and prevention of fraudulent activity in the muni-market). 
 68. See supra Sections II.B-C (analyzing the Tower and discussing the roles of the SEC and MSRB). 
 69. See supra Sections II.B-C (analyzing the Tower and discussing the roles of the SEC and MSRB). 
 70. See supra Sections II.B-C (analyzing the Tower and discussing the roles of the SEC and MSRB). 
 71. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 50 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 228. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. The “direct or indirect” language from the Tower is the go to language when opposing SEC or 
MSRB regulatory efforts. See infra Sections III.E.1–3 (discussing efforts made by those opposing addi-
tional muni-market regulation). Therefore, rather than calling the existing regulatory framework what is 
for all intents and purposes indirect regulation, this article will opt to call it “circuitous.” 
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surrounding whether additional regulation should come into effect, as well as 
whether the Tower should be repealed or modified. Subpart F then recaps the areas 
addressed in part III and prepares to swap lenses for the viewing of part IV and the 
“Micro-Level.” 
A. Indirect Circuitous Regulatory Framework 
The MSRB and SEC have created various rules working within, and arguably 
toeing the lines of the confines of existing statutory limitations regarding muni-
market regulation. As discussed below, the MSRB and the SEC exerting their power 
over the muni-market in this manner has created a piecemeal regulatory framework. 
Given that there are various restrictions as to the “direct or indirect” regulation of 
muni-issuers,75 regulatory agencies have had to become creative in how they regu-
late the muni-market. As argued above, the only restriction on the SEC with respect 
to the regulation of muni-issuers is the inability to require pre-sale filing docu-
ments.76 Regardless of this narrow restriction, the SEC has opted to refrain from 
promulgating nearly any substantive rules which would, technically, directly or in-
directly regulate muni-issuers (even post-filing). 
While there is no explicit restriction in terms of post-filing, or continuing dis-
closures (directly or indirectly from muni-issuers), there is also no affirmative au-
thority for it. Additionally, given muni-issuers original exemption from much of the 
Exchange Act, it might be presumed that the SEC cannot require any disclosures 
from muni-issuers.77 While the restriction as to the “indirect” regulation of muni-
issuers appears on its face to be contradictory to the overall purpose and intent of 
regulating the muni-market through muni-dealers, regulatory authorities have opted 
to work within the constraints of a conservative reading of the Tower. Rather than 
contest whether the Tower governs, and suggest that other sections of the 1975 
Amendments override its language, the SEC and MSRB have chosen to operate 
using the specific affirmative authorities granted by the 1975 Amendments (author-
ization to regulate muni-dealers in 15(c)).78 To do so, the SEC has created Rule 
15c2-12,79 which has since become the primary method of requiring disclosures in 
the muni-market.80 
While a semblance of disclosure currently exists, choosing to operate within 
narrow interpretations of the Tower has led to muni-issuers having great latitude in 
determining the form and substance of their offering documents.81 In other words, 
the roundabout circuitous regulatory framework currently in place has ultimately 
permitted a lack of uniformity in muni-issuers offering documents. Following is a 
brief, non-exhaustive discussion on how the SEC and MSRB have respectively reg-
ulated the muni-market to date. 
                                                          
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (2012). 
 76. See supra Section II.B.1 (analyzing the text of the Tower). 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(12)(A)(ii). 
 78. Id. § 78o-4(c). 
 79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2010). 
 80. See Municipal Securities Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/municipal/municipal-securities-disclosure.html. 
 81. See infra Sections IV.B.1-2 (providing an example of how arguably inappropriate some muni-
issuer’s chosen accounting principles are). 
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1. SEC Regulation 
Rule 15c2-1282 requires underwriters participating in the issuance of municipal 
securities to acquire the muni-issuer’s deemed final official statement prior to bid-
ding, purchasing, or offering their securities.83 While the final official statement 
must be acquired by the underwriters involved, it may omit significant infor-
mation.84 For example, the offering price and aggregate principal amount offered 
may be omitted and the statement still be “deem[ed] final.”85 In addition, if under-
writers are in possession of a preliminary statement, they are required to submit it 
to any potential customers (on request) within one day.86 It is important to note that 
this requirement is entirely dependent on whether or not the underwriter even has a 
preliminary statement.87 Another major feature of 15c2-12 restricts underwriters 
from purchasing or selling municipal securities unless the underwriter “reasonably” 
determines that the issuer, or persons on their behalf, have a written agreement to 
supply the MSRB with the muni-issuer’s annual financial information and notice 
within ten business days of certain events.88 These events include financial difficul-
ties, delinquencies, and changes to the muni-issuers’ credit ratings.89 Interestingly, 
the underwriter need only be “reasonably” certain that an agreement exists.90 Fur-
ther, these agreements are not with the MSRB, but rather with a party that agrees to 
make certain disclosures to the MSRB.91 
2. MSRB Regulation 
The MSRB has created 48 rules to date.92 The MSRB has classified these rules 
into one of five categories: Professional Qualification, Fair Practice, Uniform Prac-
tice, Market Transparency, and Regulated Entity Administration.93 Professional 
Qualification rules set minimum standards for those working within the muni-mar-
ket, as well as explain what activities would result in disqualification from contin-
ued practice.94 The Fair Practice rules are concerned with protecting investors, 
muni-issuers, and muni-dealers.95 While a smaller number of the Fair Practice rules 
relate primarily to investor protections,96 the rules primarily ensure muni-dealers 
                                                          
 82. Exemptions from 15c2-12 include: Entire issues that are less than $1 million, all bonds sold in 
units greater than $100,000 to no more than 35 sophisticated investors, bonds which mature in less than 
9 months (with minimum $100,000 unit per unit), and bonds issued prior to July 1995. 17 C.F.R. § 
240.15c2-12. 
 83. Id. § (b)(1). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. § (b)(2). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. § (b)(5)(j). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Rule Book, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BOARD i (Oct. 1, 2017), 
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/pdfs/MSRB-Rule-Book-PDF-Current-Quarter.pdf [hereinafter MSRB Rule 
Book]. 
 93. As of April 1, 2017, there were 4 Rules classified as Professional Qualification, 25 as Fair Practice, 
5 as Uniform Practice, 3 as Market Transparency, and 8 as Regulated Entity Administration. Id. 
 94. Id. at ii (referencing rules G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5). 
 95. Id. at i. 
 96. For example, Rule G-10, relating to the Delivery of Investor Brochures. Id. at 50. 
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are competing for business fairly.97 In contrast, Uniform Practice rules are mainly 
drafted to maintain equal treatment of muni-market investors.98 Market Transpar-
ency rules on their face contain disclosure provisions;99 however, these provisions 
are largely ineffective. For example, § (a) of Rule G-32 is titled “Customer Disclo-
sure Requirements.”100 This section requires muni-dealers to deliver a copy of a 
muni-issuer’s official statement to investors by the settlement date of their transac-
tion.101 These statements must be delivered, but they are permitted to be prelimi-
nary.102 Further, as will be addressed in part IV of this article, the lack of disclosure 
requirements or standardization of information in official statements often results 
in much of their contents being of little use even when provided to investors.103 The 
final classification, Regulated Entity Administration, contains rules focused on set-
ting record keeping standards for muni-dealers.104 While these records are required 
to be preserved, they are not necessarily disclosed to regulators or investors.105 
B. Evidencing the Inadequacy of Circuitous Regulation 
As outlined above, the regulatory scheme in place that involves the SEC and 
MSRB currently provides a wealth of direct and indirect circuitous disclosure and 
functional requirements on, in practice, all parties involved in the muni-market.106 
Given the oblique methods that have been used in creating this framework, compli-
ance requires minimal effort.107 Further, its fragmented nature has resulted in a 
framework that is largely unhelpful in terms of the ability to detect or prevent po-
tentially fraudulent activity in the muni-market. 
For example, 15c2-12 requires the submission of a final official statement prior 
to the purchase, offer, or sale of a municipal security.108 While the statement must 
be submitted, a final official statement “may” not include the offering price, interest 
rate, compensation of involved underwriters, aggregate amount of issuance, deliv-
ery dates, terms of bidding, credit ratings, or even the identities of the underwrit-
ers.109 Theoretically, if a muni-issuer chooses to omit all that is permissible, a final 
offering statement could consist of the name of the issuer, the date, and the fact that 
the municipality is issuing a security, yet be a compliant final official statement 
under 15c2-12.110 
Evidence of the inability to detect material misstatements or noncompliance 
with continuing disclosure obligations under 15c2-12 can be seen most clearly in 
                                                          
 97. For example, MSRB Rule G-37 prohibits political contributions from muni-dealers to candidates 
who are elected or running for office in municipalities where they are seeking business. Id. at 269. 
 98. For example, MSRB Rule G-12, in part, requires the delivery of municipal securities to all inves-
tors be at the same rate. Id. at 57. 
 99. Id. at x-xi. 
 100. Id. at 238. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See infra Sections IV.B.2–3 (evidencing the difficulties of deciphering financial statements due to 
the lack of uniform accounting principles in muni-issuer statements). 
 104. MSRB Rule Book, supra note 92, at i, ix, xi. 
 105. Id. at i (referencing rules G-1, G-6, G-7, G-8, G-9, G-16, G-27, G-41). 
 106. See supra Section III.A (discussing existing regulation over the muni-market). 
 107. See supra Section III.A (discussing existing regulation over the muni-market). 
 108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(1) (2010). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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the events surrounding the SEC’s Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Coopera-
tion Initiative (“MCDC Initiative”).111 The MCDC Initiative was established in 
March of 2014 to “address potentially widespread violations” of securities laws by 
muni-dealers and muni-issuers. 112 The initiative was implemented to encourage 
muni-dealers and issuers to self-report their violations of continuing disclosure ob-
ligations or federal securities laws relating to misstatements in their offering docu-
ments.113 As a reward for self-reporting violations, muni-dealers and muni-issuers 
would receive favorable settlement terms.114 The nature and design of this initiative 
in itself points to the inability to detect violations in the muni-market. The end re-
sults of the initiative provide even stronger evidence for this proposition. 
The MCDC Initiative concluded on February 2nd, 2016 with 72 different un-
derwriters being charged as a result of voluntary self-reporting.115 These 72 under-
writers were charged in less than two years, and this number does not include seven 
other high-profile cases against muni-market issuers and underwriters during the 
same time period.116 In contrast, the SEC’s Office of Municipal Securities lists a 
total of two cases relating to municipal securities in 2012 and eight in 2013.117 The 
drastic difference in the number of SEC charges brought while the MCDC Initiative 
was in effect (79) compared to those in preceding years (10) evidences that there 
are likely actual widespread securities laws violations across the muni-market that 
are largely undetectable. Arguably, the inability to detect violations is a result of the 
fragmented regulatory framework in place, and more specifically, as will be argued 
below, the lack of uniform accounting principles in the muni-market. 
C. Remedying the Inadequacy of Circuitous Regulation 
The SEC and Government Accountability Office have released a report and 
recommendations on how to improve the fair functionality of the muni-market.118 
The SEC Report included recommendations for legislation that would do the fol-
lowing: (i) require muni-issuers to disseminate official statements to investors and 
potential investors for the entire term that a security is issued; (ii) exclude conduit 
borrowers from registration exemptions afforded to muni-issuers;119 (iii) establish 
uniform principles for financial statements; (iv) require audits of financial state-
ments; (v) allow safe harbors for forward-looking statements; (vi) establish a system 
                                                          
 111. Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation Initiative, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/municipalities-continuing-disclo-
sure-cooperation-initiative.shtml. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See SEC Completes Muni-Underwriter Enforcement Sweep, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
(Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-18.html. 
 116. See Municipal Securities Enforcement Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 5, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/municipal/oms-enforcement-actions.html. 
 117. Id. 
 118. SEC Report, supra note 1, at vii-x. 
 119. Conduit borrowing is when a municipality issues a security for use by a third party unrelated to 
the issuer. For example, a muni-issuer issues a bond and the proceeds of the bond go to finance a project 
undertaken for profit by a company. In this case, the municipality would still be responsible for paying 
back the debt, but the money invested would be used for purposes unrelated to the municipalities’ actual 
activities. See supra Part I (discussing the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation – an ex-
ample of conduit borrowing). 
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which would promote more seamless sharing of information between the IRS and 
the SEC; and (vii) require bond trustees to enforce the terms of continuing disclo-
sure agreements.120 The SEC Report also noted that the SEC and MSRB could enact 
further rules and modifications to Rule 15c2-12 regulating muni-dealers.121 
While there are many proposed solutions and methods to continue improving 
upon the regulatory scheme surrounding muni-markets, this article argues that the 
most impactful modification would be to require muni-issuers to use uniform ac-
counting principles in their financial statements included as part of their official 
statements. 
As discussed above, there seems to be an inability to detect violations by muni-
dealers and muni-issuers. The benefits from requiring uniform accounting princi-
ples used can be placed into two categories—preventing fraudulent activity and in-
creasing muni-market participation. 
First, uniform accounting principles would greatly increase regulatory author-
ities’ ability to deter and detect fraudulent activity. If there was uniformity amongst 
the financial data that muni-issuers are already required to supply, the data could be 
run through algorithms to detect suspicious accounting activity. These algorithms 
could easily cross reference financial statements from previous and future years to 
quickly determine whether or not the stated uses of an issuance were accurately 
represented to the investing public. For example, if a municipality issues a bond to 
repay earlier bonds that have higher interest rates, an algorithm could easily deter-
mine whether repayments on prior bonds were actually made. The systems analyz-
ing these uniform inputs would be able to present red flags, much like those in de-
velopment and in place for the stability of our financial markets.122 In short, the 
ability to input uniform financials into computation systems would substantially 
increase the efficiency of regulatory agencies’ enforcement efforts. 
Second, uniform accounting would also allow for greater accessibility for indi-
vidual investors. As it stands now, there are numerous muni-issuers who use vary-
ing levels of complexity of accounting methodologies in their financial statements, 
which in no way resemble Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), 
as is discussed later in part IV.123 Currently, numerous muni-issuers’ Official State-
ments include multiple pages describing the primary differences between their ac-
counting practices and GAAP.124 As evident in the number of pages needed to de-
scribe these differences, this information is not easily digestible for an individual 
investor.125 In short, a rule requiring the use of GAAP may well open the muni-
market up to a large number of new investors, which would benefit muni-issuers, 
muni-dealers, and the investing public. 
                                                          
 120. SEC Report, supra note 1, at vii-x. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Kara M. Stein, A Vision for Data at the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 28, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-stein-10-28-2016.html. 
 123. See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing debt recognition principles in North Bergen, New Jersey). 
 124. See infra Section IV.B.1 
 125. Or for that matter, a third-year law student at GWU. As noted earlier, one of the primary reasons 
legislators decided to create a regulatory framework within the muni-market was because it would “sub-
stantially benefit the increasing number of individual investors who find the tax-exempt features of these 
securities attractive.” S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 3 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 228. 
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Suggestions for improving the functionality of muni-markets are in no short 
supply.126 Despite this, regulatory reform in the field has been slow-moving.127 This 
stunted pace is in large part due to the level of pushback, mainly from special inter-
est groups whenever the SEC or MSRB discuss potential new muni-market rules.128 
This pushback has been instrumental in preventing progress toward improving the 
muni-market regulatory framework.129 Further, more often than not, the parties in 
opposition to muni-market reform use the Tower Amendment as a basis for their 
arguments.130 The following subpart attempts to address the identities and motives 
of the parties that are continually involved in efforts to oppose muni-market reform. 
Given the frequent use of the Tower in opposition to virtually any proposed muni-
market regulations, the following discussion focuses on opposition to efforts that 
have been made to appeal or amend the Tower as well as implementing additional 
regulatory requirements. 
D. Those in Opposition to the Repeal or Amendment of the Tower 
Every few years there are renewed pushes for repealing the Tower or increasing 
reporting and disclosure requirements in the muni-market.131 Each time, various or-
ganizations appear in opposition. The following addresses the identities of three 
nonprofits who have been particularly outspoken opponents of further muni-market 
regulation: the National Association of State Treasurers (“NAST”),132 the Council 
of State Governments (“CSG”),133 and the Government Finance Officers Associa-
tion (“GFOA”).134 
                                                          
 126. SEC Report, supra note 1, at vii-x. 
 127. See supra Sections III.A–B (discussing inadequacy of the muni-market’s circuitous regulatory 
framework). 
 128. See infra Sections III.D–E (discussing opposition to muni-market regulatory reform). 
 129. See infra Sections III.D–E (discussing opposition to muni-market regulatory reform). 
 130. See infra Sections III.D–E (discussing opposition to muni-market regulatory reform). 
 131. See e.g., Luis A. Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More Transpar-
ent, Liquid, and Fair, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/making-municipal-securities-market-more-transparent-liquid-
fair.html (“The Tower Amendment . . . plays a critical role in denying investors accurate and timely 
disclosures, by limiting federal regulatory authority over issuers of municipal securities” and thus, the 
first step in making the municipal securities market fairer is the “[r]epeal of the Tower Amendment.”); 
Elisse B. Walter, Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market: Investors Are Not Second-Class Citi-
zens, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 28, 2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102809ebw.htm (“as politically unpopular as this sugges-
tion may be, I believe that the exemptions for municipal securities should be removed from the 33 and 
34 Acts and the Tower Amendment should be repealed.”). 
 132. About, NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. TREASURERS, http://nast.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 133. About, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T, http://www.csg.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 134. About GFOA, GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, http://www.gfoa.org/about-gfoa (Dec. 14, 2017). 
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1. The National Association of State Treasurers135 
NAST is a nonprofit comprised primarily of state treasurers and state senior 
finance officials.136 NAST describes its purpose as providing “advocacy and sup-
port that enables member states to pursue and administer sound financial poli-
cies,”137 and promotes itself as “[l]eading voices for excellence in public fi-
nance.”138 NAST is a fairly large organization, and as with many of the organiza-
tions lobbying against muni-market reform, NAST has identifiable connections 
with other groups against muni-market reform. For example, in their 2013 Form 
990,139 NAST listed $2,542,058 in revenue for 2014, $974,426 of which went to 
CSG for “management and staff support.”140 
2. The Counsel of State Governments 
CSG is a nonprofit founded in 1933 that advocates on behalf of state govern-
ments’ interests.141 Their mission statement is, “CSG champions excellence in state 
governments to advance the common good.”142 CSG has one of the largest networks 
of state government cooperation and interaction.143 Given its size, CSG’s advocacy 
work is related to countless state government issues other than muni-market re-
form.144 Regardless, the size and network of CSG necessarily means that its oppo-
sitions to muni-market reform carries significant weight. 
                                                          
 135. Entertainingly, a submitted question on a website dedicated to the appropriate forms of address 
for various officials posed, “Our office is currently debating the use of ‘Honorable’ . . . we are not clear 
. . . whether or not those state treasurers . . . can use the title. Can you please help us?” This question was 
submitted by, “J.L. @National State Treasurers Association.” The response was to check what each 
Treasurer’s home state’s tradition was. Robert Hickey, How to Address a State Treasurer, HONOR & 
RESPECT: THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO NAMES, TITLES, & FORMS OF ADDRESS, 
http://www.formsofaddress.info/USOS.html#493 (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). NAST made their deci-
sion, as their 2013 form 990 refers to their trustee and board members as “Honorable.” National Associ-
ation of State Treasures, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organiza-
tions/592017623 (last visited Dec. 14, 2015). 
 136. About, supra note 132. 
 137. Id. 
 138. NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. TREASURERS, http://nast.org (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 139. The IRS form 990 is a required annual filing from most non-profits and organizations claiming 
tax-exempt status. About Form 990, Return of Organizations Exempt from Income Tax, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-990. 
 140. National Association of State Treasures, supra note 135. 
 141. About, supra note 133. 
 142. Id. 
 143. About: CSG Regional Offices, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T, http://www.csg.org/about/region-
aloffices.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 144. COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T, http://www.csg.org/ (last visited Dec, 14, 2017) [hereinafter CSG Homep-
age]. 
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3. The Government Finance Officers Association145 
GFOA is a nonprofit that describes itself as a representative of more than 
19,000 federal, state, provincial, and local finance officials.146 GFOA is similar to 
the CSG with respect to its large network.147 The primary difference between the 
two is that the GFOA focuses on public finance, whereas, CSG’s coverage is far 
more expansive.148 GFOA’s stated mission is, “to promote excellence in state and 
local government financial management.”149 More specific GFOA objectives can 
be found in a publication by the National Association of Municipal Advisors 
(“NAMA”), another nonprofit that also opposes muni-market reform.150 In a 2015 
publication discussing their collaboration with the GFOA, NAMA stated, “[t]he 
GFOA [p]riorities for 2015 have been outlined to include maintenance of tax-ex-
emption for municipal securities . . . [to] continue to monitor [and react to] the MA 
Rule and associated regulations . . .  and [to] oppose any efforts to repeal the Tower 
Amendment . . . .”151 
As seen above, nonprofits are overwhelmingly comprised of people substan-
tially involved in the issuing of municipal securities. It can be argued that prevent-
ing additional regulatory efforts is almost certain to benefit these individuals. That 
is, due to less regulatory requirements, states and municipal finance officials can 
raise capital with little to no oversight. Little to no oversight means that elected 
officials, and their municipal finance officials, can issue debt securities on behalf of 
municipalities that may be unable to ever repay such debt. In the short term, this 
fact would be of little importance to these elected officials because they can display 
an image of investing in and rebuilding their communities. This image can then be 
used to ensure they keep their position in the next election cycle. Consequently, 
their appointed finance officials can keep their positions as well. Further, this hy-
pothetical is assuming muni-issuers would inject capital raised into the local com-
munity. Unfortunately, as discussed in part I, there are numerous issuers who have 
issued securities for uses completely unrelated to the betterment of local communi-
ties, in which case, the individual benefit would be the more obvious monetary 
gain.152 While it is clear that state treasurers and state finance officials would prefer 
                                                          
 145. GFOA’s 990 form for 2014 lists revenue of $14,590,262; $4,838,782 of which went to compen-
sation for its 49 employees. This excludes the $1,066,517 for employee benefits, $1,589,658 for office 
expenses (this amount is not for rent or even renovations, but rather “office equipment”), $242,461 for 
“Other,” and $470,189 for travel expenses. The financials of GFOA are substantially similar to those of 
previously mentioned nonprofits. The point here is not to suggest that some individuals running non-
profits may appear to be taking advantage of the current regulatory framework surrounding nonprofits 
in order to receive substantial personal benefit. The aim is simply to present the available data. Although, 
it would be interesting to see what $1.5 million in “office equipment” for 49 employees looks like. Gov-
ernment Finance Officers Assn of the United States & Canada, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propub-
lica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362167796 (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 146. About GFOA, supra note 134. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.; CSG Homepage, supra note 144. 
 149. About GFOA, supra note 134. 
 150. Pre-Trade Transparency: It’s Not Just for Investors, NAT’L ASS’N OF MUN. ADVISORS (June 24, 
2015), http://www.municipaladvisors.org/assets/docs/newsletters/15-nama-newsletter-6-24-15.pdf. 
 151. Id. at 8. 
 152. See supra Part I (discussing to examples of muni-issuers improperly issuing securities to the det-
riment of their communities). 
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less regulation, these benefits do little to offset the inherent and unnecessary dangers 
likely to stem from the current lack of oversight mechanisms in the muni-market. 
The list of public interest nonprofits that have spoken in general support of 
maintaining the status quo with respect to muni-market regulation continues with 
various amalgamations of the words finance, public, municipal, association, na-
tional, state, and so forth.153 In short, there are countless organizations opposing 
muni-market reform. There does not seem to be a single institution opposing muni-
market reform comprised of parties who are not intimately involved in the muni-
market issuance process.154 
E. The Art of Concision 
Concision, in itself, is useful to convey an idea in a compact manner. Concision 
can also allow a party to choose the idea they want to convey by dissecting language 
from the source text, which can ultimately lead to a severe distortion of the source’s 
original meaning.155 As discussed below, the above mentioned public interest 
groups appear to be highly paid masters of artful concision. In an effort to be as 
equitable as possible to the aforementioned organizations, below are the public 
statements that convey the logic and reasoning most frequently used in their oppo-
sitions. The following first lists the source and public statement, and then provides 
an analysis of the merits of such positions. 
1. NAST Supports Preservation of the Tower156 
“The Tower Amendment prohibits direct or indirect federal regulation of muni-
issuers.”157 
The above quote seems to be a commonly stated phrase; it is a sentence uttered 
by many of the nonprofits involved in opposing repealing or amending the 
Tower.158  Despite its frequent use, the language of the Tower does not read as pro-
hibiting the direct or indirect federal regulation of muni-issuers.159 As detailed in 
part II of this article, the text distinguishes between the authority of the SEC and 
the MSRB, and makes explicit efforts to convey that the restriction on the SEC 
relates specifically to its inability to require filing of disclosure documents prior to 
                                                          
 153. Examples include: The National Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators, The State 
Debt Management Network, the National Institute of Public Finance, National Federation of Municipal 
Analysts, and the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers. This list is not 
nearly exhaustive. Each state then has their own version of the national brand, for example, the GFOA 
of Texas. 
 154. As in, individual investors rather than State Treasurers, local finance officials, and/or muni-deal-
ers. 
 155. See Concision, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concision (last visited Dec. 13, 2017). 
 156. NAST Supports Preservation of the Tower Amendment, NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. TREASURERS, 
http://nast.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Tower-Amendment-6915-ONE-PAGER.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2017). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See infra Section III.E.2 (discussing identical language used in opposition to repeal of the Tower 
by CSG). 
 159. See supra Section II.B (analyzing text of the Tower and discussing the limited restrictions the 
Tower placed on the SEC as relates to muni-market regulation). 
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the issuance of a municipal security.160 Further, as touched upon previously, the 
Senate Report on the 1975 Amendments makes it clear that the amendments would 
result in establishing “regulation over the muni-market.”161 When considering the 
text of the Tower, and the full text of the 1975 Amendments, it would be incongru-
ent to suggest that the Tower prohibits all direct or indirect forms of federal regula-
tion of muni-issuers. 
“Repeal or amendment of the Tower Amendment would lead to increases in 
the issuance costs for state and local governments.”162 
While this might be the case, the counter can be argued as well. Were amend-
ment to occur, it could instruct regulatory bodies to begin drafting new rules.163 
These rules would probably include uniform standards in the form and substance of 
issuing documents,164 with uniformity issuers could experience lower costs relating 
to issuances. That is, if there were uniformity, the market would become more liq-
uid, due to increasing investor participation. This might well also bring in more 
underwriting firms involved in the issuance process, which would ultimately in-
crease competition and lower costs for muni-issuers. 
2. CSG: Resolution Opposing Amendment or Repeal of the Tower165 
“The Tower Amendment prohibits direct or indirect federal regulation of muni-
issuers.”166 
This is identical language to that used in the NAST statement above.167 As pre-
viously mentioned, NAST pays CSG for consulting services.168 CSG employees 
likely drafted this document and language for NAST, and subsequently used it 
themselves. “The municipal marketplace is already regulated by . . . blue sky laws, 
federal tax laws, the anti-fraud enforcement power of the SEC . . . [the] MSRB . . . 
independent credit rating agencies, and the demanding requirements of the capital 
markets.”169 
The muni-market is regulated; the issue is whether the current framework is 
sufficient. Blue sky laws exist, but appear to be largely ineffective with respect to 
                                                          
 160. See supra Section II.B (analyzing text of the Tower and discussing the limited restrictions the 
Tower placed on the SEC as relates to muni-market regulation). 
 161. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 3 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 228. 
 162. NAST Supports Preservation of the Tower Amendment, supra note 156. 
 163. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (providing examples of the SEC’s efforts to urge Con-
gress to repeal or amend the Tower so as to enable the SEC to strengthen its regulatory framework 
surrounding the muni-market). 
 164. SEC Report, supra note 1, at vii-x (discussing recommendations for improving muni-market reg-
ulation, including as relates to moving towards uniformity). 
 165. The CSG and NAST statements interestingly (maybe), covered both defensive and offensive 
stances in their opposition of repealing the Tower. As seen in the NAST opposition being titled as “sup-
porting the preservation” of the Tower, and the CSG opposition being titled as, “in opposition” to repeal. 
M. Jodi Rell & Kim Koppelman, Resolution Opposing Amendment or Repeal of the Tower Amendment, 
COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T, (May 31, 2008), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/resolution-oppos-
ing-amendment-or-repeal-tower-amendment. 
weramendmentresolution--final.pdf. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra Section III.E.1 (discussing identical language used in opposition to repeal of the Tower 
by NAST). 
 168. See supra Section III.D.1 (discussing NAST and the fact that NAST pays CSG for consulting 
services). 
 169. Rell & Koppelman, supra note 165. 
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the muni-market and often do not provide regulatory requirements that fill in the 
holes in the federal patchwork regulatory framework. For example, in New Jersey, 
municipalities are disallowed from issuing bonds if their net debt exceeds 3.5%.170 
While this is explicit, New Jersey also permits municipalities to adopt their own 
accounting methodologies so long as they generally follow state guidelines.171 Mu-
nicipalities are afforded a large amount of deference in doing so.172 As will be ex-
plained in detail in part IV, this permits municipalities to use accounting methodol-
ogies that deduct nearly half of their outstanding debt when compiling their finan-
cial statements.173 Doing so essentially makes the 3.5% ceiling in New Jersey law 
relatively pointless. With respect to the existing SEC anti-fraud enforcement au-
thorities, the 1975 Senate Report showcases the legislative intent to allow the SEC 
to create preventative rules in the municipal securities area in addition to its en-
forcement responsibilities.174 
3. GFOA: GFOA Rebuffs SEC Bid to Oversee Accounting Stand-
ards175 
“The GFOA opposes SEC involvement with standard-setting [uniform ac-
counting principles] for muni-issuers . . . such involvement violates the basic tenet 
of federalism, given that the power to set accounting standards for state and local 
governments ultimately belongs to the states.”176 
This language reads as analogous to commonly used state sovereignty argu-
ments. The balancing of state and federal powers has been debated since the coun-
try’s inception. The counter argument is essentially one based on interstate com-
merce in that the issuance of municipal securities is not confined within a single 
state.177 Investors can be, and often are, located throughout the country, and there-
fore, the federal government has a vested interest in ensuring the fairness and sta-
bility of the muni-market.178 
S72410-37 (Comment on SEC Proposal): Including municipal securities 
under the definition of Asset Backed Securities would, “clearly violate . . 
. the Tower Amendment, which explicitly prohibits the SEC from requir-
ing municipal security issuer to file with the SEC or MSRB documents 
prior to the sale of securities.”179 
                                                          
 170. N.J. REV. STAT. § 40A:2-6 (2013). 
 171. See infra Section IV.B.1. (discussing debt recognition practices in North Bergen, New Jersey). 
 172. See infra Section IV.B.1. (discussing debt recognition practices in North Bergen, New Jersey). 
 173. See infra Section IV.B.1. (discussing debt recognition practices in North Bergen, New Jersey). 
 174. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 50 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 228. 
 175. Susan Gaffney, GFOA Rebuffs SEC Bid to Oversee Accounting Standards and Mandate Disclo-
sures for Issuers of Municipal Debt, GOV’T FIN. REV., Oct. 2007. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of Municipal Securities 
Regulation, 34 J. CORP. L. 739, 753-757 (2009) (providing a far more comprehensive analysis of feder-
alism arguments surrounding municipal security regulation). 
 178. Id. 
 179. William Daly et at., RE: File Numbers S7-24-10 and S7-26-10, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-10/s72410-37.pdf (this was a com-
ment opposing proposed SEC rules which the GFOA signed alongside 13 other organizations, including 
NAST). 
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Regardless of whether including municipal securities under the definition of 
Asset Backed Securities would clearly violate the Tower, this statement accurately 
represents the text of the Tower.180 
F. Swapping Lenses for the Micro-Level 
The SEC and MSRB have creatively regulated the muni-market, primarily 
through the regulation of muni-dealers.181 In creating this framework, the strict ad-
herence to certain narrow interpretations of the Tower and the 1975 Amendments 
has resulted in a regulatory scheme with various shortcomings.182 For example, the 
lack of uniform disclosure hinders regulatory authorities’ abilities to detect viola-
tions of federal securities laws.183 This subpart has argued that the difficulty in re-
forming the regulation of muni-markets is in large part due to lobbying efforts of 
public interest groups that are intimately involved in the issuance of municipal se-
curities. These groups at times use artful concision to make their points, which, as 
argued above, can result in distortions of the source in which the arguments are 
based. In order to forward conclusive evidence of how the current regulatory frame-
work is insufficient, part IV increases the level of zoom and enters the “Micro-
Level.” This final lens focuses on the difficulties of detecting potential securities 
laws violations by using the Township of North Bergen, New Jersey (the “Town-
ship”) as a case study to speak specifically to the problem with a current lack of 
uniform accounting principles in the muni-market. 
IV. THE MICRO-LEVEL: THE TOWNSHIP, THE AUTHORITY, AND THE 
DIVISION 
Part IV is comprised of three subparts. Subpart A establishes the setting and 
relevant characters necessary to tell a story about the Township. Subpart B discusses 
the significant differences between the Township’s chosen accounting principles 
and GAAP. Following subpart B are a variety of calculations used to support the 
proposition that the Township’s financial stability may be likely to take a turn for 
the worse. Subpart C builds upon these calculations to suggest potential violations 
of federal securities laws stemming from the Township’s activities as a muni-issuer. 
Subpart C then concludes with a discussion of the causality dilemma, followed by 
a restatement as to how instrumental uniform accounting principles in the muni-
market would be for the prevention and detection of fraudulent activity and the cre-
ation of a more efficient and fair muni-market. 
                                                          
 180. It should be noted that the various organizations referenced seem to be selective in how they de-
scribe the Tower, likely dependent on audience. For example, in an article on its website, GFAO de-
scribes the Tower as, “[the] SEC is prohibited from directly regulating issuers under the 1975 Tower 
Amendment.” GFOA Alert: The SEC MCDC Initiative and Issuers, GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N (July 
7, 2014), http://www.gfoa.org/gfoa-alert-sec-mcdc-initiative-and-issuers. 
 181. See supra Part III.A (discussing current regulatory framework surrounding municipal securities). 
 182. See supra Part III.A (discussing current regulatory framework surrounding municipal securities). 
 183. See supra Part III.B (evidencing how most securities laws violations in the muni-market are likely 
not discovered by regulatory agencies). 
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A. Setting and Characters 
1. The Township, the Authority, and the Division 
The Township lies on the Hudson river across from Manhattan.184 The 2010 
census lists the Township as having a population of 60,773.185 The Township is, as 
of the 2010 census, the 23rd most populous municipality in New Jersey.186 In New 
Jersey, a “township” is one of five models for municipalities to choose from when 
crafting their local governance structure.187 Each of these five models have their 
own organizational framework.188 There are an additional seven optional governing 
models that can be adopted to supplement one of the five base types.189 The Town-
ship has a modified governance model under the Walsh Act of 1911.190 Under this 
particular model, the population votes for 5 Commissioners, the newly elected 
Commissioners then vote amongst themselves to determine which of them will be 
the Mayor.191 The Commissioners are then each charged with running one of North 
Bergen’s five departments, which are Public Affairs, Parks and Public Property, 
Public Works, Revenue and Finance, and Public Safety.192 
The North Bergen Municipal Utilities Authority (the “Authority”)193 is classi-
fied as a public body corporate and politic of the state, and was established in 
1981.194 It operates the Township’s sewage system.195 The Division of Local Gov-
ernment Services, Department of Community Affairs, State of New Jersey (the “Di-
vision”) is the body that created the accounting guidelines that the Township uses 
(loosely) in place of GAAP.196 
                                                          
 184. North Bergen Township, Hudson County, New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: FACTFINDER, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited Dec. 
14, 2017). 
 185. Id. 
 186. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, New Jersey: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 2012), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-32.pdf. 
 187. The five are: Borough, Township, City, Town, and Village. Types of New Jersey Municipal Gov-
ernment, N.J. ST. LEAGUE OF MUNS., http://www.njslom.org/types.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 188. Id. 
 189. The seven additional governing models are: Commission, Council-Manager, Mayor Council, 
Small Municipality, Mayor-Council-Administrator, and Special Charters. Id. 
 190. Official Statement of Township of North Bergen: $17,725,000 General Improvement Refunding 
Bonds, MCELWEE & QUINN A-2 (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.mcelweequinn.com/system/files/job-
pdfs/16/2016_northbergentwp_os.pdf [hereinafter April 2016 Official Statement]. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. The Township chose to use the “Authority” as an abbreviation in their 2013 bond issuance’s offi-
cial statement, rather than the less ominous shortening, “MUA”, it opted to use in a more recent Official 
Statement. Official Statement of the North Bergen Municipal Utilities Authority: $16,120,000 Sewer 
Revenue Refunding Bonds, MCELWEE & QUINN 1 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.mcelweequinn.com/sys-
tem/files/job-pdfs/2013_northbergenmua_os.pdf [hereinafter 2013 Official Statement]. 
 194. Id. at 1, 8. 
 195. Id. at 8. 
 196. Id. at E-5. 
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2. Director, Commissioner, Mayor, Senator Nicholas Sacco 
Nicholas Sacco first became a Commissioner in 1985, Mayor and Assistant 
Superintendent of Schools in 1991,197 and a State Senator in 1994.198 Since 1994, 
Sacco has held all four positions continuously.199 Sacco and Township employees 
have received numerous allegations relating to corruption, official misconduct, and 
nepotism.200 To date, Sacco has evaded the various allegations aimed at him. While 
Sacco may have dodged these allegations, there have been multiple charges and 
convictions of senior level Township employees for conspiracy, official miscon-
duct, and or tampering with public records.201 In short, the best way to describe 
corruption in the Township would simply be to say that it is telling when a munici-
pality’s Wikipedia page has its own subsection entitled “Corruption.”202 
B. Division Principles vs. GAAP 
Appendix B of the Authority’s 2013 official statement has 5 pages of single 
spaced text dedicated to explaining the many differences between Division princi-
ples and GAAP.203 There are numerous differences between Division principles and 
GAAP; however, arguably, the most problematic difference relates to how, under 
                                                          
 197. Sacco was Assistant Superintendent until salary caps were instituted by Governor Christie in 2010, 
after which Sacco became, “Director of Elementary and Secondary Education.” It cannot be definitively 
stated that Sacco changed positions because of the new caps on Superintendent pay. Although, what is 
known is that this new position provided a salary of $253,100.00 in the 2014-2015 school year. This is 
an amount separate from salaries and benefits resulting from his roles as a Commissioner, Mayor, and 
State Senator. North Bergen School District 2014-2015 Salaries, PI BUZZ, https://pibuzz.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2014/12/North-Bergen-SD-2014-2015-Salaries.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 198. Members: Senator Nicholas J. Sacco, N.J. LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/mem-
bers/bio.asp?leg=140 (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 199. While not relevant to this article’s purpose, it is interesting how Sacco has been able to maintain 
his positions for the last quarter of a century. In large part, Sacco is able to win elections due to the 
sizeable amounts of money the North Bergen Democratic Municipal Committee (NBDMC), a Political 
Party Committee, is able to raise in support of him. For example, the NBDMC raised $522,972.84 in 
anticipation of the 2015 Mayoral race. Receipts and Expenditures Quarterly Report, N.J. ELECTION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION (Apr. 13, 2015) (on file with the University of Missouri Business, Entre-
preneurship & Tax Law Review). The overwhelming majority of donations made to the NBDMC come 
from Township employees buying $150 tickets to the annual Mayor’s Ball. Id. In addition, there have 
been multiple allegations from Township employees claiming they are forced to buy tickets to avoid 
backlash from supervisors, regardless of whether they actually attend. John Heinis, Witness: James Wiley 
Forced NB DPW Workers to Buy Tickets to Sacco Fundraisers, HUDSON COUNTY VIEW (May 28, 2015), 
http://hudsoncountyview.com/witness-james-wiley-forced-nb-dpw-workers-to-buy-tickets-to-sacco-
fundraisers/. Also, it appears these events are paid for by Sacco’s own 501(c)(3) nonprofit whose mission 
is to, “promote citizenship and collegiality among members of the community.” Nicholas J. Sacco Foun-
dation, Inc. Form 990-EZ, CITIZENAUDIT.ORG, http://pdfs.citizenaudit.org/2016_07_EO/27-
0853744_990EZ_201506.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 200. Most of which can be gleaned from an ethics complaint filed by Larry Wainstein, who lost an 
election running against Sacco in 2015. John Heinis, UPDATED: Larry Wainstein Files NJ Dept. of 
Education Complaint Against Mayor Nick Sacco, HUDSON COUNTY VIEW (Mar. 25, 2015), hud-
soncountyview.com/larry-wainstein-files-nj-dept-of-education-complaint-against-mayor-nick-sacco/. 
 201. Katherine Guest, Ex-NB DPW Official James Wiley: ‘I Got Caught With my Hand in the Cookie 
Jar’, HUDSON COUNTY VIEW (June 11, 2015), http://hudsoncountyview.com/ex-nb-dpw-official-james-
wiley-i-got-caught-with-my-hand-in-the-cookie-jar/. 
 202. North Bergen, New Jersey: Corruption, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Ber-
gen,_New_Jersey#Corruption (last visited Sept. 14, 2017). 
 203. 2013 Official Statement, supra note 193, at A-32-36. 
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the chosen methodology, not all of the Township’s liabilities are considered debt 
for calculating its total debt.204 
The ability to exclude actual liabilities from the Township’s financial state-
ments allows it to obtain inflated credit ratings by distorting its debt to income ra-
tio.205 It might well be argued that credit agencies are thoroughly investigating and 
calculating the ratings of muni-issuers, and are therefore, fully aware of the creative 
accounting principles used by the Township. However, recent history and events 
surrounding the 2008 financial crisis would lead to a different conclusion.206 In ad-
dition, this distortion enables the Township to stay far below New Jersey statutory 
debt maximums.207 With higher credit ratings, the Township can more easily issue 
larger bonds.208 In practice, the Township has, and continues to issue a series of 
bonds to repay bonds the Authority has already issued.209 After several years, the 
Authority (or another Township entity whose debts are not deemed “debt” under 
their accounting methodologies) issues a larger bond to repay the Township’s 
debts.210 This cycle results in the Authority (or equivalent entity whose debts are 
excluded) holding an ever-growing majority of the debt so that the Township can 
maintain and increase its credit rating and borrow more.211 This is dangerous be-
cause eventually the Township will not be able to issue a large enough bond to cover 
its liabilities, which could realistically lead to bankruptcy. This may be an inevitable 
result, but it will likely be delayed for a significant period of time because the Town-
ship can have other entities whose debts are also excluded, issue bonds.212 
                                                          
 204. See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing debt recognition principles in North Bergen, New Jersey). 
 205. See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing debt recognition principles in North Bergen, New Jersey). 
206 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 
SMU L. REV. 209 (2008) (describing events surrounding the economic crisis). 
 207. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 40A:2-6, 40A:2-42 (2013) states that no bond ordinance may be adopted by a 
municipality if its net debt exceeds 3.5%. The equation for which, is total debt divided by the average of 
the last three years of equalized valuations of taxable real estate + improvements made on the same 
property. The Township’s audited financials for 2015 lists a total of $56,952,381.84 for Net Debt. The 
financials then divide this by $4,785,952,085.67, which is the amount the Township reached using the 
equation above. This results in a Statutory Net Debt Percentage of 1.19% for 2015. As mentioned earlier, 
the net maximum debt percentage is 3.5%. If the entirety of the Township’s liabilities to be included, 
their Net Debt Percentage would be 2.75% ($130,254,793.84/ $4,785,952,085.67). Township of North 
Bergen Hudson County, New Jersey Report on Examination of Accounts for the Year Ended December 
31, 2015, NORTHBERGEN.ORG, http://www.northbergen.org/_Content/pdf/budgets/CY-2015-Audit.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2017) [hereinafter NB Audit Report 2015]. 
 208. Daniela Pylypczak-Wasylyszyn, Municipal Bond Investing Glossary, MUN. BONDS (June 24, 
2015), http://www.municipalbonds.com/education/glossary/. 
 209. For example, the Township issued a $28,937,415 in March 2016, for which $24,111,415 was 
slated to pay a note due in April of 2016. The remaining $4,826,000 was to be used for new Township 
projects. Official Statement of Township of North Bergen $28,937,415 Bond Anticipation Note, 
ELECTRONIC MUN. MKT. ACCESS 4 (Mar. 31, 2016), https://emma.msrb.org/ES771504-ES606130-
ES1001877.pdf [hereinafter March 2016 Official Statement] Similarly, the Township issued an addi-
tional $17,725,000 in April 2016, the use of which is less clear, as its purpose was “to advance refund 
all or a portion of the 17,760,000 of the outstanding callable principal amount of the…Bonds, dated May 
15, 2009.” April 2016 Official Statement, supra note 190, at 1. 
 210. See Pylypczak-Wasylyszyn, supra note 208. 
 211. Id. 
 212. For example, other entities whose debts are excluded under the Township’s accounting method-
ologies are – the Board of Education, Municipal Library and Municipal Parking Authority. March 2016 
Official Statement, supra note 209, at A-19. 
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1. Debt Recognition Specifics 
In order to address the significance of the difference in liability recognition, it 
is first necessary to explain how and why separate fund accounting is used in mu-
nicipalities’ financial statements. A fund is how municipalities separate their assets 
and liabilities based on specific types of expenditures.213 For example, the Town-
ship has a “Current Fund,” that is used for expenditures relating to governmental 
operations and includes administrative costs.214 This fund has its own financial 
statements created, which are kept separate from the other funds’ statements.215 The 
audited financials of all funds are then presented separately within the Township’s 
financial statements.216 The Township has five separate funds – Current Fund, Trust 
Fund, General Capital Fund, Capital Fixed Assets,217 and Public Assistance Trust 
Fund.218 
The issue referenced earlier relates to whether the funds adequately capture the 
entirety of the Township’s liabilities. The Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board (“GASB”) has issued a pronouncement that requires financial statements to 
include all financial activities for which a municipality is financially accountable 
(which GAAP complies with).219 In contrast, Division principles have no such re-
quirement and defer to municipalities to determine which operations should be 
deemed separate entities for financial reporting purposes.220 The Township has used 
this deference to conclude that the Authority is a separate entity not related to Town-
ship’s “functions or activities,” and, therefore, its financial statements need not be 
included in the Township’s financial statements.221 The ability to make this deter-
mination, at least regarding the Authority, stems from its unique classification as a 
public body corporate and politic of the state.222 
The liabilities of the Authority not being included would not be an issue so long 
as the Township were not in fact liable for the debts. Moreover, this general logic 
appears to be the rationale for why the Division’s alternative accounting methodol-
ogy allows for these types of exclusions. At first glance, it would appear that the 
Township is not liable. That is, the Authority’s 2013 Official Statement’s first page 
states in all caps, 
THE 2013 BONDS ARE DIRECT AND GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
THE AUTHORITY. THE AUTHORITY HAS NO POWER TO LEVY 
OR COLLECT TAXES, AND THE 2013 BONDS ARE NOT DEBT OR 
                                                          
 213. Separate accounting for funds is also part of GAAP, the idea generally being that this method 
makes it easier to determine how each department used their budget. 
 214. 2013 Official Statement, supra note 193, at A-31–32. 
 215. Id. at A-32–33. 
 216. Id. at 32-33. 
 217. Capital Fixed Assets is technically an account group used to account for the assets and liabilities 
not captured in one of the other funds. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at B-32. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at C-18. 
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LIABILITY OF . . . THE TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BERGEN (EXCEPT 
AS SET FORTH IN THE SERVICE CONTRACT)[.]223 
This quote explicitly says the bonds are not debt of the Township; however, the 
referenced service contract states the exact opposite.224 This quote claims that the 
bonds are not debts or liabilities of the Township, when the bonds really are debts 
and liabilities of the Township. As set forth below, this service contract may result 
in the Township being forced to levy higher taxes to pay off the bonds. Article IV, 
§ 401 of the referenced service contract states, 
The Township . . . pledge[s] [its] power to levy ad valorem taxes upon all 
the taxable property . . . to satisfy . . . obligations under this Agreement . . 
. [t]he [a]nnual charges . . . shall be the sum equal to the difference between 
the expenses of operation . . . the principal of and interest on any and all 
bond as the same become due . . . . 225 
This contract is not exactly user friendly. It essentially states that the Township 
is liable for, and required to levy taxes in order to pay, “[a]nnual charges.”226 These 
annual charges are an amount computed by the Authority in the amount necessary 
to cover its operational costs, which includes payments on bonds it issues.227 This 
is more easily discernable in the Official Statement for the 2013 Bonds, 
Pursuant to a Service Contract (as defined herein) entered into by the Au-
thority [and] the Township . . . the Authority may impose Annual Charges 
upon the Township . . . in an amount sufficient for the Authority to pay 
for, among other things, the expense of operation and maintenance of the 
Sewerage System and the principal of and interest on any and all Bonds, 
including the 2013 Bonds, as they shall become due . . . [i]n the opinion of 
Bond Counsel to the Authority, the Township has the power, and has the 
ultimate obligation, to levy ad valorem taxes upon all the taxable real prop-
erty in the Township for the payment of such Annual Charges . . . as the 
same become due, without limitation as to rate or amount, if such funds 
are not otherwise available.228 
In practice, this Service Contract means that the Township would be entirely 
responsible for required payments if the Authority were to be unable to make them. 
That is, if the Authority were to go bankrupt, the debt holder would likely file a 
motion to assume the Service Contract. Doing so would enable them to force the 
Township to cure the default under their obligation to pay “annual charges.”229 In 
addition, the Authority provides essential services for the municipality; bankruptcy 
or default is an unlikely option without the Township also having to follow suit.  
                                                          
 223. Id. at 1. 
 224. Id. at 302. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1. 
 229. Id. at 302. 
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In short, the Division’s principles allow for significant liabilities that the Town-
ship is responsible for to be unrecognized as liabilities in financial statements used 
in the issuance of new municipal securities. Now to address exactly how the Town-
ship’s Division accounting principles have resulted in severely skewed debt calcu-
lations for the Township. 
2. The Math230 
Division principles permit the Township to severely deflate its total outstand-
ing debt to income and assets ratios.231 For example, the Township’s 2015 financials 
list tax collections as $131,772,784.26,232 and $22,134,880.52 in miscellaneous rev-
enues.233 This is a total of $153,907,664.78 for income in FYE 2015. In terms of 
assets on hand, fixed assets owned are listed as $57,670,34.12,234 and 
$18,443,221.40 is listed for “in cash” at year end.235 The financials list Net Debt as 
$56,952,381.84, which does not include the following debt the Township is respon-
sible for: $55,178,043 from bonds the Authority issued; $10,435,000 in outstanding 
Certificates of Participation issued by the Board of Education,236 $3,870,000 owed 
for issuances used for “School Purposes,”237 and $7,689,369 owed to the North 
Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue under a capital lease.238 These liabilities sum to 
$134,124,793.84. Further, the Township ended 2014 with approximately 
$20,643,947.85 in cash (assets were substantially similar in 2014).239 This rough 
                                                          
 230. The following is not exactly riveting, but the calculations are the basis of Part IV’s overall argu-
ment. To note, all of the following figures are accurate approximations; in a decision to preserve sanity, 
this article does not include insubstantial amounts in determining assets (less than $500,000). To set off 
any potential skewing this may cause, the calculation of the present value of Pension liabilities is also 
not included; those amounts would far outweigh any excluded asset amounts. 
 231. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
 232. NB Audit Report 2015, supra note 207. 
 233. Miscellaneous Revenues include funds stemming from issuing liquor licenses, collecting fines, 
and receiving grants. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. This amount is the cash balance across all funds that hold cash in excess of 500,000. While there 
are other balances, they are substantially lower (in the low hundreds of thousands). Id. 
 236. Certificates of Participation appear to be a method to issue a bond, without calling it a bond, which 
prevents the amounts from being added to total debt. This particular issuance involved the BOE borrow-
ing approximately $10,000,000 from AHG Leasing, Inc. for the renovation of various schools in the 
Township. The method calls the repayment of this debt “lease/rent payments,” rather than debt payments. 
The Official Statement of this issuance is extremely explicit in stressing that the Township has no obli-
gation to pay this debt, only the BOE does. The BOE gets its budget from the Township. Further, the 
Certificates of Participation are secured by seven elementary and secondary schools located in the Town-
ship, including the land they are built upon and equipment/materials therein. This means that should 
default occur, AGH is permitted to take possession of all properties, until the default is cured. These 
properties make up a significant percentage of the Township’s assets. Given these facts, it is hard to 
imagine a situation where the BOE defaults and the Township does not have to take over the payments, 
other than one in which the Township defaults as well. For all intents and purposes, the Township is 
liable for this additional $10,435,000. Official Statement of the Board of Education of the Township of 
North Bergen: $5,590,000 Refunding Certificates of Participation, ELECTRONIC MUN. MKT. ACCESS 
(June 29, 2010), http://emma.msrb.org/EA387846-EA305176-EA700813.pdf. 
 237. Division accounting principles also allow for the deduction of monies borrowed for school im-
provements. April 2016 Official Statement, supra note 190, at A-48. 
 238. March 2016 Official Statement, supra note 209, at A-47. 
 239. Township of North Bergen Hudson County, New Jersey Report on Examination of Accounts for 
the Year Ended December 31, 2045, NORTHBERGEN.ORG, http://www.northbergen.org/_con-
tent/Pdf/budgets/CY-2014-Audit.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2017); NB Audit Report 2015, supra note 207. 
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calculation means that the town spent most of, or the entirety of, its revenue in FYE 
2015 in order to wind up with slightly less cash in hand at the close of the year.240 
The math will now get murkier in an attempt to establish the Township’s debt 
liability relating to municipal securities for 2016. In addition to the various principal 
amounts reaching maturity on an annual basis, each liability also carries interest.241 
Most of these issuances carry about 4% interest, payable twice a year.242 Using a 
4% assumption across all debt and no payments towards the principal until they 
become callable (this generally appears to be the case), this amounts to approxi-
mately $5,210,191.75 in annual interest payments.243 In 2016 the principal amounts 
due across all issuances was at least $4,670,000.244 These amounts combined will 
result in annual payments for debt payments relating to bond issuances in 2016 of 
approximately $9,885,191.75. 
C. Applying the Math and the Causality Dilemma 
Part IV’s purpose is to highlight a concrete example of how prevention of reg-
ulatory authorities from enacting new requirements in the muni-market negatively 
impacts its fair and efficient operation and the ability of regulatory agencies to de-
tect potential securities laws violations. 
Subpart B’s analysis relating to the Township’s liability for the Authority’s 
issuances and subsequent calculations established evidence of arguably false or ma-
terially misleading misrepresentations in the Township and Authority’s Official 
Statements. For example, the 2013 Official Statements explicitly stated, “the 2013 
bonds are not debt or liability . . . of the Township.”245 While a careful, and close 
reading of the 2013 Official Statement would lead a potential investor to conclude 
that for all intents and purposes, the Township is liable for these debts, the language 
stating that the bonds are not the Township’s liabilities is explicit and arguably ma-
terially misleading. 
Moreover, the Township’s April 2016 Official Statement lists maturity and in-
terest payments due for outstanding bonds as $3,096,379.17.246 Even accounting for 
a significantly large margin of error in the calculations presented in subpart B, the 
amount disclosed in the 2016 Official Statement is not remotely close to the number 
more likely representative of the bond payments that the Township was responsible 
for in 2016 (approximately $9,885,191.75).247 With this in mind, it should be 
                                                          
 240. Sincerest apologies to any accountants offended by the simplistic reasoning and calculations used 
in making this point. 
 241. Issue Details: North Bergen Municipal Utilities Authority, ELECTRONIC MUN. MKT. ACCESS 
(OCT. 9, 2013), https://emma.msrb.org/IssueView/IssueDetails.aspx?id=ER356961 [hereinafter NB Util-
ities Authority]; North Bergen TWP NJ, ELECTRONIC MUN. MKT. ACCESS, https://emma.msrb.org/Issu-
erHomePage/Issuer?id=B212762B293F98335E829507929F820B&type=G (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 242. NB Utilities Authority, supra note 241. 
 243. While normally interest payments should lower over time, this appears not to be the case with the 
Township, because they continue to issue new and larger bonds, and the current outstanding issuances’ 
interests accrue. April 2016 Official Statement, supra note 190, at 2. 
 244. This is the sum of the various callable amounts of bonds issued directly by the Township, and 
those issued by the Authority (the sum does not include amounts due for every issue/debt [for example, 
the previously mentioned BOE certificates], however, the callable amounts used in this calculation are 
the largest by far). NB Utilities Authority, supra note 241. 
 245. 2013 Official Statement, supra note 193, at 1. 
 246. April 2016 Official Statement, supra note 190, at A-52. 
 247. See supra Section IV.B.2 (calculating the Township’s estimated bond repayments for 2016). 
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stressed that while muni-issuers have been afforded substantial exemptions from 
the provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act, they are not exempt from 
anti-fraud provisions (e.g., 17(a) and 10(b)).248 
Further, the process of identifying these potential violations serves to highlight 
the difficulty that regulatory authorities would face in the detection of potential mis-
statements, primarily due to the lack of uniform accounting principles. If authorities 
were to investigate a municipality much like the Township, they would first have 
to dissect the particularities of their accounting principles. Further, even though the 
Township complies with the Division’s accounting principles, this does not mean 
that every municipality in New Jersey that uses Division guidelines has the same 
accounting methods. Rather, municipalities in New Jersey are permitted to use their 
own interpretation of Division rules.249 This means that actual accounting used by 
one municipality may differ vastly from those used in a neighboring municipality. 
The result of this is that the time it would take to find and investigate potential 
securities laws violations in municipalities using distinct accounting principles is so 
great that it might not be worth the effort. 
This article argues that if GAAP were required across the muni-market, regu-
lators could more easily detect and prevent fraudulent issuances by potentially fi-
nancially unstable municipalities. Given the general movement toward big data an-
alytics, regulatory authorities have already begun using increasingly complex algo-
rithms to sift through massive amounts of data and produce red flags, which inves-
tigative staff can then follow up on.250 The future of every industry is going to heav-
ily involve big data analytics.251 While this may be the case, algorithms are largely 
useless without uniform inputs to establish reliable parameters. If the financial state-
ments of municipalities use unique accounting principles, like those deducting more 
than half of outstanding liability from net debt, these systems will be ineffective at 
flagging suspicious events. As argued previously, the SEC has the authority to draft 
a rule addressing this issue pursuant to both the text and legislative intent behind 
the 1975 Amendments, and it is imperative that they do so.252 
The above argues in favor of uniform accounting principles, which would aid 
regulatory authorities in uncovering securities laws violations. The question comes 
to mind as to whether the examples of potentially material misstatements contained 
in the 2013 and 2016 Official Statements would have occurred if the Township ad-
hered to GAAP principles instead of crafting principles pursuant to Division guide-
lines. It can be argued that these potentially misleading statements would not have 
occurred. If that were the case, the argument regarding uniform accounting increas-
ing the ability to detect violations is moot with respect to these particular situations. 
In other words, did the lack of GAAP cause the potential misstatements, or would 
GAAP have detected the potential misstatements? This particular question will 
                                                          
 248. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 50 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 228. 
 249. See supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the Township’s debt recognition accounting methods). 
 250. See Stein, supra note 122 (SEC Commissioner statement regarding movements towards big data 
analytics). 
 251. See generally James Manyika et al., Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and 




 252. See supra Sections II.A–B (analyzing of legislative history of the 1975 Amendments and the 
Tower). 
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remain unanswerable until a time when the multiverse theory is proven and future 
generations gain the ability to peek into a nearly identical dimension that established 
GAAP principles in the muni-market at an earlier time. Regardless, the SEC was 
not only tasked with detection and enforcement of these violations,253 they are also 
tasked with creating preventative rules.254 
V. CONCLUSION 
Part II’s purpose was to discuss the regulatory framework of the muni-market. 
A story was told that addresses how a small portion of much larger statutory lan-
guage can reverberate across time, regardless of its drafter’s original intent. Part II’s 
primary argument was that drafters of the 1975 Amendments, including Senator 
Tower, never had any intention of limiting the SEC’s authority with respect to 
muni-markets. Rather, the Amendments were designed to increase regulation in the 
muni-market, and the drafters wanted the SEC to monitor and continually imple-
ment new regulatory requirements in the muni-market. The drafters fully recog-
nized the shifting floor of time, as well as their inability to predict how their statu-
tory language would be implemented down the line.255 As referenced previously, 
evidence for this position can be seen in the Senate Report on the 1975 Amend-
ments, “the Commission’s responsibility . . . includes the promulgation of prophy-
lactic rule.”256 
Part III attempted to tell a story about competing interests and the after effects 
of the statutory language dissected in part II. At its core, part III discussed why 
implementing regulation over the muni-market has been so difficult, and laid the 
groundwork for discussing why regulatory reform is necessary. The idea was to 
then choose one of the principal issues stemming from the lack of regulation over 
the muni-market (lack of uniform accounting principles), which would then have 
its importance proven in part IV using real world examples. 
Part IV provided concrete examples in order to prove that the lack of uniform 
accounting principles in the muni-market is very likely to impede regulatory bodies’ 
efforts to prevent and detect fraudulent activities. Using rough calculations, part IV 
presented potential securities law primary fraud violations resulting primarily from 
the lack of uniform accounting principles. The calculations portion also served to 
highlight how difficult and time consuming it would be for regulatory authorities to 
investigate and find potential violations if they had to decipher the unique account-
ing principles of each municipality’s individual interpretation of their state’s equiv-
alent of the Division. Part IV concluded by circling back to the notion that the SEC 
has the authority under the current regulatory framework to create a rule remedying 
this issue, and should exercise this power sooner rather than later. 
This article began by arguing for the necessity of evolving laws. Initial cursory 
research indicated that the Tower Amendment prohibited nearly all regulatory ef-
forts in the muni-market that could be made by the SEC or MSRB. After additional 
research, it became apparent that the drafters of the Tower and the 1975 Amend-
ments were clearly aware of the need for a continuously evolving regulatory 
                                                          
 253. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 50. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See supra Sections II.A–B (analyzing of legislative history of the 1975 Amendments and the 
Tower). 
 256. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 228. 
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framework in the muni-market.257 Moreover, Congress explicitly tasked the SEC 
with effecting such evolutions.258 At this point, the article’s concentration shifted to 
determine what the most likely reasons were for the seemingly distorted public rep-
resentations of the Tower Amendment and the fierce resistance to regulatory re-
form. Research into the muni-market, coupled with concurrent experience with in-
vestigatory work, sparked interest in investigating the Township. Diving into the 
story involving the Township’s various questionable activities has, at a bare mini-
mum, proven that the Township warrants the inclusion of a “Corruption” header on 
its Wikipedia page. Given the amount of time spent researching the Township’s 
activities, and the desire to deliver some of the stories uncovered, the focus then 
became on weaving together a coherent article that could incorporate this research. 
If the end result appears to be stitched together, that is because it was, much 
like the current muni-market regulatory framework. This article has little resem-
blance to its original design. On second thought, maybe this article is exactly rep-
resentative of its initial intent. This article began with stressing the importance of 
adhering to the laws of evolution, which given the continual shifts in direction, fo-
cus, and lenses, maybe the article became a product of its original intent. That 
sounds nice, but I would only claim to have intended this result if the sum of these 
changing parts has at least been mildly entertaining. 
                                                          
 257. See supra Sections II.A–B (analyzing of legislative history of the 1975 Amendments and the 
Tower). 
 258. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 228. 
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